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COMMENTS
SEAT BELTS AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
"Buckle up," the public is told in many public service advertisements. Our nation is becoming increasingly aware of automobile safety, as evidenced by the passage of the National Traffic
and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966.' What effect will this
awareness have in the courtroom? This Comment will examine
the role of the seat belt as a safety device and focus on the question of whether or not the defendant will be permitted to use the
plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt as evidence of contributory
negligence. 2 Two basic questions arise: (1) Is failure to use the
seat belt substandard conduct? and, if so, (2) what should be
the effect of such a determination?
Substandard Conduct
In general, contributory negligence8 is governed by the
same standards that determine negligence of the defendant, 4
except that contributory negligence involves exposure of the
plaintiff to an unreasonable risk. 5 The problems that normally
attend judicial determination of a standard of conduct could
be eliminated by legislation. It is well settled in Louisiana, for
1. 80 Stat. 718 (1966).
2. See Note, 12 S.D. L. REv. 130, 138 (1967), for a brief discussion on seat
belts and assumption of risk.
3. Knight v. Thomas, 141 So.2d 134, 139 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962): "Contributory negligence may be either an intentional and unreasonable exposure
to danger created by defendant's negligence, of which danger plaintiff knows
or has reason to know, or conduct which in other respects falls short of the
standard to which a reasonable man should conform in order to protect
himself from harm." See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 466 (1965);
W. PROSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 64 (3d ed. 1964). The first part of the definition is often confused with assumption of risk. "Unlike assumption of risk,
the defense [contributory negligence] does not rest upon the idea that the
defendant is relieved of any duty toward the plaintiff. Rather, although
the defendant violated his duty, has been negligent, and would otherwise be
liable, the plaintiff is denied recovery because his own conduct disentitles
him to maintain the action." W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 64, at 427 (3d
ed. 1964). See also 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 22.2 (1956).
4. W. PROSSER, THE LAW oF TORTS § 64 (3d ed. 1964).
5. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 22.10 (1956).
6. To some extent present legislation in the field of workmen's compensation is analogous. (The analogy is not complete because the employer
has not otherwise been negligent. LA. R.S. 23:1081 (1950) allows an employer

the defense that the employee deliberately failed to use an adequate guard
or protection provided for him.) See Herring v. Hercules Powder Co., 222
La. 162, 62 So. 2d 260 (1952), where the employer failed to sustain the burden
of showing that connection of a brake would have avoided the accident,
[441]
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example, that violation of a traffic law enacted in the interest
of safety is negligence per se, and actionable if it has a causal
relation with the accident.7 Thus one who failed to buckle his
seat belt in violation of a statute requiring the use of seat belts
would be negligent per se for the purpose of determining liability for resultant injuries. Presently, however, there is no such
legislation in this country. Approximately thirty states, on the
other hand, have laws requiring the installation of such devices.8
It is interesting to note that the legislatures of at least three
states have clearly stated that, although seat belts must be
installed, failure to use them will not constitute contributory
negligence."
In the absence of legislation requiring seat belt use the
courts must determine the proper standard of conduct. Negligence
can be determined by balancing the risk, in view of the social
value threatened and the probability and extent of harm, against
the value of the conduct to the actor, and the expedience of the
action taken.' 0 This balancing between risk and harm is applied
and Carter v. Christ, 148 So. 714 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1933), where the employee was denied recovery because he failed to use a safety rope. In general, see W. MALONE, LOUISIANA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 343 (1951) and latest supplement.
7. Brown v. S. A. Bourg & Sons, Inc., 239 La. 473, 118 So.2d 891 (1960),
commented on In The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 19591960 Term-Torts, 21 LA. L. REV. 322, 325 (1961); Tooke v. Muslow Oil Co.,
183 So. 97 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1938).
8. Defense Memo, 8 FOR THE DEFENSE No. 3 (1967). See Note, 14 DE PAUL
L. REv. 152 (1964), for a list of the first twenty-three states and their respective source legislation. The article contains an in-depth discussion and
analysis of seat belt legislation. The Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, 32 C.F.R. § 2408 (1967), effective January 1, 1968, require installation
of a combination lap belt and upper torso restraint (shoulder harness) in
all out board seat positions that have the windshield header within the
head impact area and either a lap belt-upper torso restraint combination
or a lap belt in all other positions. Id. Standard No. 208, S3.1.1. See LA. R.S.
32:1401 (1950) for the enactment of the Vehicle Equipment Safety Compact
which was enacted in 1964. Louisiana joins approximately thirty-eight other
states with similar legislation providing for an interstate commission with
authority to conduct research and recommend legislation requiring the installation of safety devices in vehicles. The organization is set up now and
only time will tell whether or not it will be effectively operated.
9. Minnesota: MINN. STAT. ANN. § 169.685(2) (1964); Tennessee: TENN.
CODE ANN. § 59-130(3) (1964); Virginia: VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-309.1 (b) (1966).
10. Professor Prosser states: "It is fundamental that the standard of
conduct which is the basis of the law of negligence is determined by balancing the risk, in light of the social value of the interest threatened, and the
probability and extent of the harm, against the value of the interest which
the actor Is seeking to protect, and the expedience of the course pursued."
W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 31, at 152 (3d ed. 1964). Even though this
speaks of negligence, it can be applied to an analysis of contributory negligence. See note 4 supra. Although this Comment is concerned with contributory negligence, It should be mentioned, in passing, that one could be sub-
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to determine whether the plaintiff has unreasonably exposed
himself to danger so as to constitute contributory negligence.
In considering the magnitude of the risk, inquiry should be made
into the probability and gravity of the harm."
Mathematical certainty is not required in the balancing
process. However, statistics are of some help in determining the
probability that the risk will materialize. The present ratio of
deaths and injuries per million passenger miles from traffic
accidents is approximately one death for every 15 million pas2
senger miles and one injury for every 365 thousand miles.1
So expressed, the probability of death or injury does not seem
great. 13 In considering this factor, courts should also evaluate
the effect which seat belts would have on this ratio. 14 Courts
will encounter difficulty because there are no statistics which
can be said to be absolutely authoritative. Figures released by
the National Safety Council, however, may be used as a guideline. These figures indicate that seat belt use would save between eight and ten thousand lives each year' and reduce
serious injuries by at least one-third.16 Certainly the legisjected to liability for negligence for not having worn his seat belt. Consider,
for example, the situation in which the front seat passenger is secured by a
seat belt and the passenger in the back seat is not. Upon impact the rear
passenger will be thrown forward and will collide with the front seat passenger, who will remain stable. (No doubt this possibility leads to the requirement of installation of belts in the back seat.) In litigation between the
two colliding parties, points raised in this article could be applied to determine any negligence of the back seat passenger in not using the device.
11. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 466, comment c of clause a, at
512 (1965); W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 31 (3d ed. 1964). See also H.
Terry, Negligence, 29 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1915).
12. In 1966 passenger car mileage amounted to 730 billion miles. THE
WORLD ALMANAc 799 (1966). In 1965 motor vehicle accidents accounted for
48,900 deaths and at least 1,800,000 injuries, of which 150,000 resulted In
permanent impairment. Id. at 685. Figures for 1966 would be higher.
13. Couched in other terms, highway death statistics can be quite alarming. For example, between January 1961 and January 1965 approximately
2,000 military personnel were killed in Vietnam. During the same period of
time, more than 6,900 servicemen were killed in automobile accidents on the
public roads. Hearings on H.R. 13228 Before the Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 89-37, pt. 1, at 615 (1966).
14. A detailed study of the value of the seat belt as a safety device is
beyond the scope of this Comment. See Note, 1967 Wis. L. REV. 288, 292, for a
factual study which was placed as an appendix to the decision of Bentzler
v. Braun, 49 N.W.2d 626 (Wis. 1967). See Note, 12 S.D. L. REV. 130 (1967), for
a discussion of the possible prejudicial effects of judicial notice of the seat
belt as a safety device.
15. National Safety Council, Belt Value Reappraised, 26 FAMILY SAFETY
No. 2 (June 1967).
16. Note, 1967 Wis. L. REv. 288, 292; Note, 14 DE PAUL L. REv. 152 (1967);
Bentzler v. Braun, 149 N.W.2d 626, 630 (Wis. 1967).
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lation, campaigns of various organizations, 17 and widespread
use by law enforcement agencies and racing drivers indicates
that the belt is a safety device, but more study and statistical
analysis is needed before the courts will be able to use figures
in this balancing process with a high degree of precision.
The courts should also consider evidence of the possible
detrimental nature of seat belt use. This is another area in which
difficulties in determining which evidence is most reliable will
be encountered. Numerous articles can be found which discuss
case studies and other isolated instances of injuries caused by
seat belts.' 8 The court, however, will be concerned with the
overall picture, and this is where the problem arises.
The plaintiff's view is found to be:
"...

. The standard waist type seat belt can cause more, rather

than fewer, injuries in many crash conditions. Other researchers have also concluded that the value of seat belts
is limited."' 1
Of course, just what "many" means is unclear. It could be several hundred and yet constitute a small percentage of total
accidents.
Defense counsel can find comfort in these words:
"Only in the most severe crash conditions are serious injuries likely to be associated with seat belt application.
Even under these conditions, however, evidence derived
17. United States Public Health Service, National Safety Council, American Society of Safety Engineers, American Medical Association, Auto Industries Highway Safety Committee, Automobile Safety Foundation, American
College of Surgeons, and the General Federation of Women's Clubs, to name
a few. Defense Memo, 7 Foe THE DEFENSE No. 6 (1966).
18. Cocke & Meyer, Splenic Rupture Due to Improper Placement of
Automobile Safety Belt, 183 J.A.M.A. 693 (1963); Fisher, Injury Produced by
Seat Belts, Report of Two Cases, 7 J. OCCUPATIONAL MED. 211 (1965); Garrett

& Braunstein, Seat Belt Syndrome, 2 J. TRAUMA 220 (1962); Howland, Fulcrum Fracture of Lumbar Spine Induced by an Improperly Placed Seat
Belt, 193 J.A.M.A. 240 (1965); Kulowski & Rost, Intra-Abdominal Injury
From Safety Belt in Auto Accidents, Report of a Case, 73 ARCH. SURG. 970
(1956); Rubovits, Traumatic Rupture of the Pregnant Uterus from "Seat
Belt" Injury, 90 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 828 (1964); Tolins, Unusual
Injury Due to Seat Belt, 4 J. TRAUMA 397 (1964); White, The Role of Safety
Belts in the Motorist's Safety, 9 CLINICAL ORTHOPEDICS 317 (1957).
19. Kleist, Seat Belt "Defense" Attacked, TRIAL, August/September 1967,

at 50.
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from an earlier study indicates that automobile occupants
' 20
are better off with a seat belt than without one. 7
Hopefully, future research and statistical analysis will furnish
the courts with less conflicting data.
Gravity of Harm
Another factor in the balancing process is the gravity of
the harm should the possibility of injury materialize. 1 As grave
injuries or deaths increase, the probability needed for finding
negligence decreases. 22 Common experience indicates that the
gravity is exceedingly high, and statistics graphically demonstate this point. 23 In weighing this factor, the courts should again
consider evidence concerning the effect seat belt use would have
24
on deaths and injuries.
The magnitude of the risk should then be weighed against
the value which the law attaches to the supposed or real advantages enjoyed by the plaintiff in not wearing the safety belt.
Social Value of Non-use
Economically, purchase and installation of seat belts are
inexpensive. 25 This factor alone, balanced against the size of the
risk, conclusively favors seat belt use. A more important element, however, is the value society attaches to non-use. Public
attitude is reflected in the extent of use. One report indicates
that only thirty per cent of passenger cars have seat belts installed and they are only used fifty per cent of the time.26 Another report covered 1,974 seat belt equipped autos involved in
accidents. Belts were not in use at the time of the accident in
sixty-three per cent of the cases.27 This is another area in which
20. Garrett & Braunstein, Seat Belt Syndrome, 2 J. TRAUMA 220, 235
(1962). For a complete presentation of the entire area of seat belt negligence
from a defense viewpoint see THE SEAT BELT DEFENSE (1967), a booklet, complete with case discussions and bibliography, published by Defense Research
Institute, Inc. 1212 West Wisconsin Avenue, Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53233.
21. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 466, comment o on clause a, at
512 (1965); W. PROSSER, THE LAw OF TORTS § 31 (3d ed. 1964).
22. See generally H. Terry, Negligence, 29 HAuv. L. REV. 40 (1915).
23. See note 12 supra.
24. See text at notes 14-18 supra.
25. E.g., approximately seven dollars per set In the Baton Rouge, Louisiana, area.
26. Defense Memo, 7 FOR THE DEFENSE No. 6 (1966), citing a survey made
by the American Trial Lawyers Association.
27. Note, 14 DE PAUL L. REV. 158 (1964), citing a joint study by the California Highway Patrol and the Automotive Crash Injury Research Center
of Cornell University.
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one is faced with a wide range of figures. Consider, for example,
the results of a current survey.2 8 It revealed that over fifty-two
per cent of the cars surveyed (1,700,000) had seat belts installed,
that approximately thirty-seven per cent of the drivers of cars
surveyed always used the device, ten per cent never used them,
and eighty-nine per cent used the belt some of the time. An
earlier survey conducted by the same organization indicated
that seventy-six per cent of those questioned used the belt on
long trips.2 9 A poll taken by the Columbia Broadcasting Company30 for use on one of its National Driver's Tests revealed
that about twenty-five per cent of the sample used the belt on
short trips and forty per cent interviewed at a turnpike toll
booth were using the device. 31 Though the figures do indicate
an increase in seat belt use, it appears that society as a whole
attaches greater importance to whatever reason it finds to justify
2
non-use.3
In determining whether non-usage is sub-standard conduct,
the courts should consider the extent of use by the public. However, such custom should not control if it can be shown that a
reasonable man would wear the belt. 3 Evidence of custom is
relevant only "as indicating a composite judgment as to the
risks of the situation and the precaution required to meet them.
...If

the actor does what the others do under like circumstances,

there is at least a possible inference that he is conforming to
83 4
the community standard of reasonable conduct.

28. Conducted by the Auto Industries Highway Safety Committee and
Reported in DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, THE SEAT BELT DEFENSE 11 (1967).
29. Defense Memo, 7 FOR THE DEFENSE No. 2 (1966).
30. Aired over national television on December 5, 1967.
31. It is of interest to note that three out of four traffic deaths occur
within twenty-five miles of home and more than half of all accidents causing
injury or death are at speeds less than forty-five miles per hour. 12 CURRENT
MEDICINE FOR ATTORNEYS 28 (1965).

32. No statistics were discovered which indicate why the safety belt Is
not used more often. Personal experience reveals that forgetfulness coupled
with supposed loss of valuable time are the main reasons. It can be argued
that one remembers well those details which he believes are important to
survival and is willing to spend a little time attending to such matters. Other
reasons include discomfort and fear of being trapped in a vehicle by a
jammed buckle. Some of the reasons are merely rationalizations used to
hide more basic feelings. For example, many say that they are afraid of
being trapped in a car on fire or under water and may be unconscious or
so severely injured that they could not release the belt. It Is obvious, of
course, that an unconscious person Is not hindered in exiting by a seat belt
and will not be aware of his fate. And It is unlikely that one who Is so
injured that he cannot release his belt buckle will otherwise be able to
extricate himself.
33. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 295A (1965).
34. Id. comment b, at 61.
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The extent of non-use should be considered when the court
evaluates the effect of its decision beyond the interests of the
immediate parties. It has been said that decisions requiring the
use of seat belts will encourage public use, 5 thus achieving an
apparently socially desirable end which outweighs any burden
that may result from the decision. It is doubtful, however, that
people who do not use seat belts to save their lives or avoid
injury will begin to do so out of concern for the outcome of
possible litigation.
Among the effects of requiring seat belt use will be a
more protracted and expensive litigation process, since another area of dispute will be injected into the proceedings.
At a time when dockets are already crowded and the basic
scheme of automobile liability is being attacked,3 6 this administrative burden will be seriously considered by the court. Another
result will be an increase in the number of uncompensated,
injured parties. Of course there is a corresponding benefit for
the defendant, and the court will be torn between concern for
the injured plaintiff and the desire to relieve the defendant
from liability for injuries which might have otherwise been
avoided by reasonable conduct on the part of the plaintiff.
Because of the far-reaching effects of such a decision, it is
submitted that the courts should not find a duty to wear seat
belts on the sole basis of what may be desirable from the standpoint of public safety. Wider acceptance by the public, as evidenced by greater use, will be a stronger indication that it is
unreasonable not to wear the device.
Jurisprudence
Of the nine cases discovered in point,3 7 four would not permit the defendant to plead contributory negligence based on the
35. 12 CURRENT

MEDICINE

FOR ATTORNEYS

28

(1965),

quoting a

Sydney

Harris column.
36. E.g., see J. O'Connell, Basic Protection-Belief for the Ills of Automobile Insurance Cases, 27 LA. L. REv. 647 (1967).
37. An interesting case not concerned with the issue of contributory
negligence is Mortensen v. Southern Pac. Co., 53 Cal. Rptr. 851 (1964). This
was an FELA case involving an accident in which the plaintiff's decedent
was in a company truck hit from the rear and forced off the highway down
an embankment. The defendant's failure to provide seat belts for its employees was held to be negligence. The court reasoned that the evidence
was sufficient to base a finding that the particular type of accident was
foreseeable. The court said: "We deal with the general likelihood of automobile collisions upon the highway, not with the peculiar causation of the
particular collision which gives relevance to the need for seat belt protec-
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failure of the plaintiff to wear seat belts. Three of the remaining
cases are from Wisconsin. The Wisconsin Supreme Court found
"a duty, based on the common law standard of ordinary care to
use available seat belts."88 The other two cases at least permitted
the defendant to raise the issue.
Brown v. Kendrick"9 involved a suit by a minor guest passenger for personal injuries. The Florida appellate court upheld
the striking of the defense of contributory negligence based on
the plaintiff's failure to fasten her seat belt. The absence of
legislation was noted, and the court said that it would not "legislate on the subject. ' 40 The issue was confused by the statement
that the defendant had not shown, "except by conjecture, that
41
the use of seat belts would have prevented the injury."
The Delaware court in Libscomb v. Diamiani42 adopted the
rule expressed in Brown. It said that, under the circumstances,
"it is extremely difficult to analyze the variables presented in
failing to buckle a seat belt upon entering an automobile for
normal, everyday driving. To ask the jury to do so is to invite
verdicts on prejudice and sympathy contrary to the law ...
Seat belts are new devices and are only a continuing step in
the development of automobile safety." 48 The many variables
involved in attempting to rule on such an issue caused the court
to admit in its conclusion that "the problem is not without
analytical difficulty. 4 4 Hence, the Delaware court, like the Florition." Id. at 854. Some emphasis was placed upon the fact that the defendant's safety experts had recommended installation of safety belts for six
years.
38. Bentzler v. Braun, 34 Wis. 2d 362, 149 N.W.2d 626, 639 (1967).
39. 192 So.2d 49 (Fla. App. 1966), noted in 10 A.T.L.A. NEWSLETTER 16
(Feb. 1967).
40. Id. at 51.
41. Id. How could he have shown otherwise if he was not even permitted
to plead the issue, much less introduce evidence. Sams v. Sams, 247 S.C. 467,
148 S.E.2d 154 (1966) (see text at note 59 infra), was acknowledged, but the
Florida court said that "[we] do not feel that this court is ready nor in a
position to adopt a similar construction as the law of Florida." Id.
42. 226 A.2d 914 (Del. Super. 1967), noted in 10 A.T.L.A. NEWSLETTER 83
(April 1967).
43. Id. at 917.
44. Id. at 918. These problems included drafting instructions to the jury,
precedent in the area of safety devices, and the fact that not all registered
vehicles are equipped with the device. In the words of the court, "Why
should the whole burden of the reasonable standard of care fall on the
person who has seat belts, but fails to use them?" Id. Also troubling the
court was the difficulty of proof of causation and the possible limiting of
traditional tort doctrines such as last clear chance and that failure to
anticipate another's negligence is not negligence such as to defeat recovery
for injury sustained. "In short, the full impact of the seat belt question
has not been fully explored to the satisfaction of this court." Id.
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da court in Brown, believed the issue to be one for the legislature. It noted that not all cars are equipped with seat belts, that
expert testimony is mere conjecture, that the failure to anticipate another's negligence is not negligence such as to defeat
recovery, and the doctrine that the defendant takes the plaintiff
as he finds him.
Simpson v. Penman45 held that the absence of seat belts in
decedent's truck was not a valid basis for finding contributory
negligence. The court said,
"[To] use the general conclusion - that the use of seat
belts would reduce vehicle fatalities - to find that in the
instant case the use of seat belts ...

would have prevented

decedent's death, again invites speculation and conjecture
beyond any reasonable point."4
Testimony by the defendant's expert that the use of seat belts
reduces fatalities was held inconclusive. He also admitted that
under certain circumstances the use of seat belts may cause
injuries.

47

The court in Kavanagh v. Butorac48 said that the defendant
did not show that studies on the safety value of the seat belt
had "wide circulation which of itself might constitute some proof
that the use of seat belts was so normal, natural, safety oriented
and generally accepted that the reasonably prudent man would
never fail (under the circumstances involved here) to 'buckle
up'. Without such showing it is our opinion that the trial court
committed no error in excluding the exhibits mentioned. '49
Looking to the future, the court said, "the many daily observations concerning use of seat belts do not necessarily reflect
the situation pertaining at the time of this accident but seem
to indicate future recognition by the common law."'50 The court
stressed that its decision that failure to fasten a seat belt was not
contributory negligence was "limited to the facts of this case."5'
45. Unreported case, N.D. Ind. (1967),

noted in

10 A.T.L.A.

NEWSLETTER

47 (March 1967).
46. Id.
47. See text at note 18 supra.
48. 221 N.E.2d 824 (Ind. App. 1966), noted 31 ALBANY L. REv. 373 (1967).
49. Id.

at 832. The

exhibits rejected

were reports by

the

American

Medical Association, National Safety Council, and Automotive Crash Injury
Research Center of Cornell University.
50. Id. at 831.

51. Id. at 833.
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Of the cases permitting a finding of contributory negligence,
Vernon v. Droeste52 is of greatest interest to Louisiana practitioners because, at the time of trial, Texas had no statute
requiring the installation of seat belts. 53 The plaintiff was in an
auto equipped with seat belts but was not wearing one at the
time of the accident. The jury answered, "We do," in answer
to the following special interrogatory:
"Do you find from preponderance of the evidence that the
plaintiff, Albert E. Vernon's, failure to wear the safety harness with which the Volvo automobile was equipped was
failure to exercise that degree of care that would have been
exercised by an ordinary prudent person under the same
54
or similar circumstances?"
The Wisconsin Supreme Court in Bentzler v. Braun,55 a
suit by an injured front seat passenger, held,
"We agree ... that it is not negligence per se to fail to use
seat belts where the only statutory standard is one that requires . . * installation . . . we nevertheless conclude that
there is a duty, based on the common law standard of ordinary care, to use available seat belts independent of any
statutory mandate." 56
Recognizing that the above statement is the law of Wisconsin, the next two cases can be considered as merely illustrative. In Busick v. Bunder 57 and Stockinger v. Dunischas the
courts informed the respective juries of the Wisconsin statute
requiring the installation of seat belts. The Busick court said
that, although the law does not require the use of seat belts,
the jury could find that the plaintiff was negligent in failing
to wear hers, and that it could consider the fact that the car
was equipped with seat belts. The Stockinger court went further
and found a duty, based on the statute, for the driver and front
52. District Court, Brazos County, Texas (85th Jud. Dist. 1966), cited in
Defense Memo, 8 FOR THE DEFENSE No. 3 (1967).

53. Also, Texas courts do not recognize the doctrine of comparative

negligence, but apply the rule

that

causal

contributory negligence

bars

recovery. See text at note 73 infra.
54. Defense Memo, 8 FOR THE DEFENSE No. 3 (1967).
55. 34 Wis.2d 362, 149 N.W.2d 626 (1967).

56. 149 N.W.2d at 639.
57. Circuit Court for Milwaukee County, Wisconsin, Civil Div., Branch 5,
Case No. 381-602, cited in Defense Memo, 7 FOR THE DEFENSE NO. 6 (1966).

58. Circuit Court for Sheboygan County, Wisconsin (October 1964), cited

in Defense Memo, 7 FOR THE DEFENSE No. 6 (1966), and Note, 1967 Wis. L.
REv. 288.
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seat passenger to wear available belts. Depending on one's viewpoint, this court was either legislating as the Florida court 59
refused to do, or carrying the statute to its logical conclusion.
In Sams v. Sams"O the South Carolina Supreme Court held
that the trial court should not have stricken the seat belt defense. It said, "We hold .. .that such questions should be de-

cided, and can be decided much more soundly, in light of the
facts and circumstances adduced upon trial."' 1
It would be difficult to state which court, if any, has the'
best view. It is submitted that the Wisconsin determination of
a duty to wear the seat belt when available 62 will ultimately
become the majority approach as litigation increases and the
value of the seat belt is realized by the public. While this view
is somewhat premature, it is by no means insupportable. The
decisions are of value particularly as a source of the objections
which must be overcome 5 before it can be said that the failure
to wear seat belts is substandard conduct.
Effect of Finding
When it is determined that non-use of the seat belt is substandard conduct and the plaintiff was therefore contributorily
negligent, he should be denied recovery only for those injuries
which he would not have sustained but for his failure to wear
the belt.6 4 A distinction must be made between the cause of the
accident and the cause of the injury. Without this process the
case will become greatly confused.
An examination of Louisiana traffic accident cases indicates
how the courts have handled somewhat comparable situations.65
59. Brown v. Kendrick, 192 So.2d 49 (Fla. App. 1966). See text at note
40 supra.
60. 247 S.C. 467, 48 S.E.2d 154 (1966).
61. Id. at 471, 148 S.E.2d at 156.
62. See text at note 38 supra.
63. For example, see text following note 44 supra. For an exercise in
legal gymnastics consider seat belt contributory negligence in relation
to last clear chance. See Comment, 27 LA. L. REv. 269 (1967), for a discussion
of last clear chance in Louisiana.
64. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 467 (1965); W. PROSSER, THE LAW
OF TORTS § 64 (3d ed. 1964). See generally W. Malone, Ruminations on
Cause-in-Fact, 9 STANFORD L. REv. 60 (1956).
65. It will be noted that the language of the court is occasionally
couched in terms of assumption of risk when technically contributory
negligence is the issue. The thin line of distinction between the two is
seldom preserved. See note 3 supra.
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Cases often arise in which the plaintiff was riding on the fender,
running board, bumper, or otherwise in a precarious position
on a vehicle.60
In Koewen v. Amite Sand & Gravel Co." plaintiff was riding on the fender of the vehicle. The court held that he had
assumed the risk incidental to the operation of the auto by the
driver, but did not assume the risk of dangers created by reckless driving of the truck which hit him.
The plaintiff in Stout v. Lewis" had been riding on the
running board of an auto. On the general issue of plaintiff's
negligence the court held that he assumed the risk of his precarious position, and "if it be said that his injuries were the
natural consequences of the risk he assumed, he cannot recover." 9 It continued, "It is not sufficient to say that he would
not have been hurt, if he had not been on the running board,
because he might have reached his destination without injury,
but for the negligent management of the car, on the running
'70
board of which he was riding; a risk he did not assume.
Jones v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America7l involved a
girl who had been riding in the rear of a pickup truck. While
rounding a corner she was thrown out. She had been instructed
to sit on the floor, and, before the accident in question, had stood
up and fallen from that position. This court also spoke of natural
consequences and found that she had not assumed the risk of
72
dangers brought about by the negligent acts of the driver.
Thus, in seat belt cases it must be shown that the plaintiff's
injury was of the type which would naturally follow from nonuse of seat belts. A plaintiff not wearing a seat belt should not
be denied recovery, for example, for injuries sustained as the
66. In addition to those discussed herein, see Vaughn v. Cortez, 180
So.2d 796 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965) (riding on fender); Smith v. Whittington,
159 So.2d 327 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964) (rear of hay truck); Jack v. Sylvester,
150 So.2d 789 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963) (riding in rear of truck without
bed); Elliot v. Coreil, 158 So. 698 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1941) (plaintiff was

riding on an improvised seat in the rear of an automobile).
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

4 So.2d 79 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1941).
123 So. 346 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1929).
Id. at 348.
Id.
104 So.2d 197 (La. App. 2d
ir. 1958).

72. Of this type of analysis Professor Prosser writes: "What is meant
is that the plaintiff's conduct has not exposed him to any foreseeable risk
of the particular injury through the defendant's negligence, and is therefore not available as a defense." W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 64, at 432
(3d ed. 1964).
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result of something falling upon the vehicle. Expert testimony
the injury would have been
will be needed to demonstrate that
73
avoided by the use of a seat belt.
If it be said that an award based upon the above criteria
does not follow the rule that a plaintiff who has been negligent
will be denied recovery entirely when his negligence was the
cause of the injury,74 Civil Code article 232375 could be applied.
"It should make no difference whether the 'thing' exposed to
the defendant's negligence is the plaintiff's interest in his property or his person."1 Perhaps Louisiana courts will be less reluctant to ignore this provision because application will be attempted in a new area of tort law. If it be applied, plaintiff will
be allowed to collect only those damages directly chargeable to
the defendant. Therefore, in the case of a plaintiff-owner who
attempts to recover for damages to his automobile as well as
his personal injuries, the court must be particularly careful to
73. See 16 AM. JUR. Proof of Facts-Seat Belt Accidents § 52 (1965).
Apparently this type of analysis is available, for statistics are often given
in terms of a certain number of accidents in which the injured may or
may not have been helped by the seat belt. For example, a study of the
San Diego, California, Police Department yielded the following results:
during the month of August 1962, 282 motorists were injured and five
killed. Seat belts would have saved five lives, prevented 49% (139) Injuries,
lessened 21% (60), and lessened or prevented 9% (26), in 6% (14) unknown
effect, and no effect in 15% (43). Defense Memo, 7 FOR THE DEFENSE No. 2
(1966). In Mortensen v. Southern Pacific Co., 53 Cal. Rptr. 851 (1964), note
37 supra, a physicist and a highway patrolman were called as expert witnesses. In Vernon v. Droeste, cited in Defense Memo, 8 FOR THE DEFENSE
No. 3 (1967), an expert testified that had the plaintiff been wearing the
seat belt-shoulder harness he would have been held away from the windshield and would not have sustained his injuries. He stated that seat
belts materially lessened injuries in 95% of the cases where they were used
and that the seat harness would be of assistance in even more instances.
Apparently his testimony was given great weight. See note 74 infra.
74. Texas does not recognize the doctrine of comparative negligence and
follows the same rule as to the effect of causal contributory negligence
that Louisiana does, i.e., a complete bar to recovery. Yet, in the case of
Vernon v. Droeste, cited in Defense Memo, 8 FOR THE DEFENSE No. 3 (1967),
the special interrogatories and the jury's answers were as follows: "Q. Do
you find from a preponderance of the evidence that such failure [to wear
the safety harness], if any, was a proximate cause of the Plaintiff, Albert E.
Vernon's, injuries? A. We do. Q. If you have answered the foregoing special issue, 'We do,' and only in that event then answer the following special
issue. What per cent of the Plaintiff, Albert V. Vernon's, injuries would
have been avoided if he had been wearing the safety harness with which
the Volvo automobile was equipped at the time of the collision in question?
A. 95%." The judgment reflected a 95% reduction.
75. See W. Malone, Comparative Negligence, Louisiana's Forgotten
Heritage, 6 IA. L. REV. 125 (1945). LA. CIviL CODE art. 2323: "The damage
caused is not always estimated at the exact value of the thing destroyed
or injured; it may be reduced according to circumstances, if the owner
of the thing has exposed it imprudently."
76. Id. at 132.

454

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXVIII

distinguish between the cause of the accident and the cause of
the injury. Admittedly, this type of problem is rarely encountered, 77 but precision in analysis would be required.
Conclusion
The possibilities of seat belt negligence are limited only
by one's imagination and future developments in the field of
automobile safety. It is not difficult to imagine, for example, a
time when one who rides in an auto not equipped with seat belts
will be as contributorily negligent as one who rides with a
drunken driver.
Though many more questions have been raised than answered, it is hoped that the reader has been introduced to an
imposing area of future litigation. If care is taken not to impose
standards of conduct on the sole criteria of what is desirable
from a safety standpoint, and a clear distinction is maintained
between the cause of the accident and the cause of the injury,
the task of working with seat belts and other safety devices in
the legal arena will be much easier.
Edwin C. Schilling III
77. Though speaking of negligence and not contributory negligence,
language of Professor James is interesting. "It must be conceded that
it is in theory possible for the defendant's conduct to be negligent only
toward property, or toward persons, and not the other. But in automobile
cases such possibility is to the last degree remote. I have never known
of such a case. Moreover, it would present no insurmountable problem to
the court or jury if it should arise." F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 11.11, at
559 (1965). (Emphasis added.) Due to the limited scope of this Note, a
more detailed discussion of the procedural and administrative aspects of
the problem is not included. In passing, the danger of splitting one's cause
of action is mentioned. In Louisiana, one sustaining both property damage
and personal injury from a single tort does not thereby acquire two separate
and distinct causes of action. McConnell v. Travelers Indem. Co., 222 F.
Supp. 979 (E.D. La. 1963); Fortenberry v. Clay, 68 So.2d 133 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1953); Bolinger v. Williams Bros., 134 So. 356 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1931). In the
Fortenberry case, the plaintiff filed two separate suits in the same court,
one for damages to his automobile, the other for personal injuries. The
property suit was tried first and plaintiff was awarded judgment. Defendant
paid and plaintiff executed a release in which he reserved all rights in the
other suit. The release being ex parte, defendant filed an exception of no
right and no cause of action in the personal injury case. In sustaining
defendant's position and dismissing the suit, the court held: "In order to
have protected his claim for personal injuries after he had failed to demand
damages therefor in his first suit, he should have either amended his
petition or dismissed his suit as of non-suit and filed another suit including
both claims." 68 So.2d at 135.
See Annot., 62 A.L.R.2d 965 (1958), for a discussion of 40 American
jurisdictions. Thirty-one states follow the rule adopted by the Louisiana
courts.

